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A COMMENTARY
ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES*
CHARLEs LIEBERT CRUM**
V.
THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION
T HE right of redemption, briefly defined, is the right enjoyed
by an owner of property to prevent a tax sale from ripening
into a tax title, through the repayment to the tax sale purchaser of
the amount given for the certificate of tax sale, plus necessary inter-
est. Its paramount importance in the law of tax titles is obvious
and difficult to overemphasize. Until the right of the former owner
to redeem from a tax sale has been legally ended, no purchaser of
land at a tax sale is entitled to feel safe in his ownership;
and this holds true even though the purchaser may have received a
tax deed, because the right of redemption often survives the issuance
of such a document-a fact sometimes discovered by the tax deed
holder to his considerable sorrow. Conversely, when once the
right of redemption has been effectively terminated, the Rubicon
in tax sale proceedings has normally been crossed: the law passes
equitable title to the tax sale purchaser immediately, even though
a deed may not have been obtained.' The issuance of the tax
deed proper becomes, thereafter, little more than a ministerial act,
since if the prior proceedings have been proper the termination of
the right of redemption forecloses virtually the last string of owner-
ship retained by the prior owner.
It is only in one case that the prior owner can thereafter assert
any significant right with respect to his former property. In the
event that it is a county which has acquired a tax title to land, the
former owner is entitled to repurchase the land so long as the title
to it remains in the hands of the county. This is, in effect, an ex-
tension of the right of redemption to the prior owner even after title
has passed from him, and the statutes formerly treated it as such.
But judicial usage has been to call this right one of repurchase, and
it is discussed under that heading subsequently.
There appear to be only two methods of ending the right of
0 Second of two parts. The first installment of this article appears in the NORTH
DAKOTA LAW REVIEW for July, 1953, beginning on page 225.
0* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
1. McDonald v. Abraham, 75 N.D. 457, 28 N.W.2d 582 (1947); Buman v. Sturn,
73 N.D. 561, 16 N.W.2d 837 (1945); Beggs v. Paine, 15 N.D. 436, 109 N.W. 322
(1906). See also note 139, infra.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
redemption from a tax sale. One method is to bold the land in-
volved in the sale in adverse possession for a period of time suffici-
ent to permit the running of a statute of limitations. The applica-
tion of such statutes to tax sale cases is taken up hereinafter.2
The other method is to make proper service of a correctly drawn
notice of the expiration of the period of redemption, since without
such service the right will continue indefinitely.
3
Numerous cases have considered the characteristics and effect of
redemption-indeed, because of its importance in tax sale cases, most
of the decisions discuss it-and a number of interesting problems
have developed. But before these are taken up, some preliminary
observations should be made.
It was pointed out in the first portion of this paper that when
land is sold for taxes it may be purchased either by a private
citizen or by the county within which the land lies.4  In either case,
the former owner retains a right to redeem the land for a statutory
period of approximately three years.' But the essential nature of
the right of redemption nevertheless varies considerably according
to the identity of the tax sale purchaser, for an interesting reason.
If the sale was to a private buyer, it constitutes a contract and is
entitled to all of the protection surrounding any other contract.6
On the other hand, if the tax sale was to a county in the first instance,
the county can assert no rights founded on a contract as against the
2. See "Statutes of Limitation," infra pp. 353-58.
3. The statute requiring notice of the expiration of the period of redemption must
be strictly complied with in order to terminate the owner's right to redeem. Knowlton
v. Coye, 76 N.D. 478, 37 N.W.2d 343 (1949); Messer v. Henlein, 72 N.D. 63, 4 N.W.2d
587 (1942); Cruser v. Williams, 13 N.D. 284, 100 N.W. 721 (1904).
4. "The county treasurer shall attend the tax sale . . . and when any tract of land or
lot remains unsold for want of bidders, the same again shall be offered for sale before
the sale is closed, and if there is no other bidder the treasurer shall bid for the same in
the name of the county, and' the same shall bc struck off and become forfeited to the
county in which the sale takes place." N.D. Rev. Code §57-2414 (1943).
5. The precise minimum period of time within which the right of redemption may
be cut off varies according to whether the land is purchased privately or by the county.
If the sale is to a private purchaser, the purchaser may obtain the issuance of a notice
of the expiration of the period of redemption immediately after the passage of a three
year period. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2702 (1) (1943). The time for redemption then
expires 90 days after the service of the notice has been completed. N.D. Rev. Code
§57-2704 (1943). Service of the notice itself may be completed in varying lengths of
time, depending upon whether service is made upon a resident or non-resident of the
state. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2702 (3) (1943). If land is purchased by the county,
notice of the expiration of the period of redemption is served on June 1 of each year
as to all land which has been held by the county for three years. N.D. Rev. Code
§57-2801 (1943). Since tax sales are held on the second Tuesday in December of each
year, N.D. Rev. Code §57-2412 (1943), this in reality gives the taxpayer a redemption
period of a little more than three and a half years, and the period is not cut off by
service of the notice on June 1 until October 1-an additional four months. N.D. Rev.
Code §57-2802 (1943). And the code extends the period within which redemption may
be made even further in the cases of minors, insane persons, or persons in captivity in an
enemy country. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2604 (1943).
6. Eikevik v. Lee, 73 N.D. 197, 203, 13 N.W.2d 94, 96-97 (1944); State ex Tel.
Atkins v. Lawler, 53 N.D. 278, 290, 205 N.W. 880, 884 (1925).
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state and the state is free to alter or change the terms of the sale
without impairing a contract obligation, since as the creature of
the state the county possesses only those rights which the state
chooses to give it. On this ground, the court has sustained legisla-
tion reducing the rate of interest which a county could charge a
redeeming landowner, even though the legislation was enacted after
the sale took place, 7 as well as legislation altering the length of the
period of redemption. 8
Different procedures are prescribed by the statutes for those cases
where land is purchased by a county and those cases where it is
purchased by a private buyer. In the case of redemption from a
purchase by the county, the landowner must pay the delinquent
taxes, costs, and interest at six per cent.9 But if the land has been
sold to a private purchaser, the amount of interest may vary from
six per cent to nothing at all. This is for a reason previously pointed
out: 0 land is offered to purchasers at tax sale for the amount of
delinquent taxes plus cost and interest. If two or more persons bid
on the land, they compete by agreeing to lower the interest rate
which will be chargeable against the delinquent taxpayer if he
should make redemption, starting from a maximum figure of six
per cent. Redemption may thus be made in such cases by tendering
the delinquent taxes plus interest at whatever rate was finally bid
by the successful buyer.
To digress briefly, it may be added that the peculiar method of
bidding described above has developed its own little body of law.
Because of the attractiveness to speculators of the interest rates
which could, in an earlier day, be demanded of a redeeming land-
owner-in some cases running as high as 24 per cent -there was
a natural tendency for purchasers at such sales to refrain from bid-
ding against one another.12 While bidding in collusion or in ro-
tation was and is illegal, 13 and a collusively accomplished sale may
be set aside while the land remains in the hands of the fraudulent
purchaser,14 the sale is treated as being merely voidable and not
void, and hence the court has held that if such land is sold to a
7. State ex rel. Atkins v. Lawler, 53 N.D. 278, 205 N.W. 880 (1925).
8. Eikevik v. Lee, 73 N.D. 197, 13 N.W.2d 94 (1944).
9. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2603 (1943).
10. Crum, A Commentary on North Dakota Tax Titles, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 225, 233 (1953)..
11. See Davidson v. Kepner, 37 N.D. 198, 163 N.W. 381 (1917).
12. Noble v. McIntosh, 23 N.D. 59, 135 N.W. 663 (1912); Graham v. Mutual Realty
Co., 22 N.D. 423, 134 N.W. 43 (1911); Youker v. Hobart, 17 N.D. 296, 115 N.W.
839 (1908).
13. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2413 (1943).
14. Youker v. Hobart, 17 N.D. 296, 115 N.W. 839 (1908). But it must be proven
affirmatively that the defendant participated in the conspiracy. Noble v. McIntosh, 23"
N.D. 59, 135 N.W. 663 (1912).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the right of the prior
owner to have the tax sale invalidated is thereby cut off.15
As already stated, until the right of redemption is properly ter-
minated it will persist until cut off by a statute of limitation. A
large number of cases evidence the fact that the effective termina-
tion of the right of redemption is often difficult and complicated.
The statutes provide that at the expiration of the three year period
which the delinquent taxpayer is allowed for redemption, the
holder of a tax sale certificate is entitled to present it to the county
auditor. The county auditor will thereupon issue a document bear-
ing the impressive caption, "Notice of the Expiration of the Period of
Redemption."' The statutes relating to this notice are strictly con-
strued in favor of the taxpayer,'" and a defect in the notice is norm-
ally jurisdictional in character.' 8  The general rule appears to be
most plainly stated in Baird v. Zahl,' 9 in which it was said that:
Any deviation from the notice prescribed by the statute either
in contents or mode of service which has any. tendency to mis-
lead or prejudice the rights of anyone having a right of redemp-
tion renders the notice ineffective and invalidates the tax deed
based thereon.
2 0
This is not to say that every mistake or error in the notice will
invalidate it, because such is not the case. Baird v. Zahl was, in fact,
a case in which a notice which was concededly erroneous in a minor
particular was upheld. Nevertheless it is plain that relatively small
errors can be of the utmost seriousness in connection with this
notice, and that the rule that the statutes regarding it are construed
in favor of the taxpayer has been rigidly applied.
Since the notice of the expiration of the period of redemption
is the means which must normally be employed to take away the
right of the former landowner to reclaim his property, it is not sur-
prising that the cases involving it have been fiercely litigated. In
general, the cases may be divided into three classes: (A) Cases
dealing with problems of making proper service of the notice;
(B) Cases dealing with errors occurring in the contents of the
15" Graham v. Mutual Realty Co., 22 N.D. 423, 134 N.W. 43 (1911). Collusive
bidding is not considered an irregularity of a jurisdictional character. Since this is so,
the right to attack a tax sale on such a ground would appear to be limited by the
short statute of limitations applicable to tax deed proceedings, N.D. Rev. Code §57-4511
(1943). As subsequently pointed out, this would appear to be one of the few cases
in which this statute is of much force or effect.
16. N.D. Rev. Code §§57-2702 (1), 57-2801 (1943).
17. Heier v. Olson, 75 N.D. 541, 30 N.W.2d 613 (1947). See cases cited note 3, supra.
18. Heier v. Olson, supra note 17; Werner v. Werner, 74 N.D. 565, 23 N.W.2d
757 (1946).
19. 58 N.D. 388, 226 N.W. 549 (1929).
20. Id. at 389, 226 N.W. at 549, syll. 2.
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notice; and (C) Cases dealing with the effect of redemption and
the extent of the right to redeem. The discussion which follows
takes up these topics in the foregoing order.
A. PROBLEMS OF SERVICE
Service of the notice of expiration of the period of redemption
is governed by two separate statutes, one of which is applicable in
the event the land involved has been sold to a private purchaser, the
other in the event that the land was bid in by the county at the
tax sale. There seems to be no good reason why this should be so,
since two statutes to regulate the service of one notice are obviously
one too many; and it would simplify matters considerably if only
one statutory system were used to regulate the method of service.
But thus far the legislature has not seen fit to change the situation.
Of the two statutes, the provision dealing with service when
the land has been purchased by a private buyer has caused the
greatest difficulty. In the case of such a purchase, the county
auditor is required to address the notice to "the person in whose
name the lands described in the certificate [of tax sale] are assessed,
and to all mortgagees or assignees of mortgagees holding unsatisfied
recorded mortgages."' Since the notice must be formally addressed
to these people, it is rather startling to discover that the statute does
not also name them as the persons upon whom it must be served,
but such is the case. Instead, the statute requires that the notice
be served on the "owner" of the land22 - who may quite possibly
be someone other than the "person in whose name the lands ...
are assessed" - and upon the person in possession of the
land, who may be quite different from either of the foregoing
persons.'- And an amendment in 1951 added to the statute a
further provision that the notice must be served upon a third class
of persons: "Any tenant or other person entitled th the possession
of said property as may appear from the records of the register of
deeds . .."24 Who is to decide whether a person is "entitled" to
the possession of property is not specified in the statute; apparently
the county auditor is required to decide this question-which is,
it may be noted, the crucial issue in most actions of ejectment-
at the peril of the tax sale purchaser.2 5 The situation of mortgagees
21. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2702 (1) (1943).
22. Id. §57-2702 (2).
23. Id. §57-2702 (3).
24. N.D. Laws 1951, c. 321.
25. If there are two conflicting record titles, for instance, it would be necessary to
determine correctly which of the two claimants would win in the event the matter were
taken to court. Presumably the simple solution would be adopted, and service" of the
notice made upon both claimants.
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under this statute is somewhat better. The notice is addressed
to them, and the code also provides that it shall be served on them
-if they have requested service in writing beforehand, paying the
county auditor a fee of one dollar and fifty cents in advance.206
If this brief outline of the statute governing service of the notice
in cases where land has been sold to a private purchaser suggests
to the reader that the statute contains several traps for the unwary,
the cases furnish abundant evidence that such is the fact. A good
illustration of the type of problem which may arise in connection
with the statute is State Finance Co. v. Mulberger,27 a 1907 de-
cision involving the following set of facts:
A obtained an invalid tax deed to land owned by B, and took
possesion of the land. It was thereafter assessed in A's name.
Thereafter A also defaulted in the payment of taxes and a second
tax sale occurred at which the land was sold to C. When C at-
tempted to obtain a tax deed, the notice of expiration of the period
of redemption was of course addressed to A, since he was, in the
language of the statute, the "person in whose name the lands
described in the certificate are assessed." When a contest there-
after arose over the title, it was held that C's tax title was invalid for
the reason that service of the notice of expiration of the period of re-
demption should have been made upon B, the original owner, rather
than A, the holder of the first tax deed. The court pointed out the dis-
tinction already noted: the statute requires service of the notice
upon the "owner" of the land instead of on the person assessed for
the taxes. As between A and B, the "owner" was self-evidently B,
since the first sale had been invalid. It will be apparent, however,
that under the statute it would have been erroneous to address
the notice to B, even though it was also erroneous not to serve it
on him, since the land was assessed in A's name! 2 This decision
makes it necessary to determine the legal validity of all prior tax
sales in every case where more than one has taken place, in order
to properly ascertain who is entitled to receive service of the
notice. However, the court has softened the effect of the ruling
somewhat by holding in a subsequent case that service of the
26. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2702 (4) (1943).
27. 16 N.D. 214, 112 N.W. 986 (1907). Accord, Hodgson v. State Finance Co., 19
N.D. 139, 122 N.W. 336 (1909). But cf. Munroe v. Donovan, 31 N.D. 228, 153 N.W.
461 (1915), app. dismissed, 245 U.S. 679 (decided under a different statute and
involving a situation where the tax sale purchaser let the land go to tax sale four additional
times to reinforce his own title).
28. An additional problem which the decision might have raised was as to the effect
of service of the notice upon B when it was not addressed to him. Might not B have
taken the position that since the notice was made out to someone else, it was not
binding on him?
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notice upon the person in whose name the land is assessed is pre-
sumptively service upon the owner, unless something in the records
indicates otherwise.29
The question of the identity of the "owner" of property for pur-
poses of the service of notice has also arisen in a different manner.
In First National Bank v. Mohall State Bank,"' a man named Dalton
gave a first mortgage on land to the plaintiff and a second mortgage
to the Mohall State Bank. The Mohall State Bank foreclosed its
second mortgage but did not carry the foreclosure proceedings to
the point of obtaining a sheriff's deed to the property. Thereafter
the American Investment Company, which had purchased the
land at a tax sale some years previously, applied for a tax deed and
got it. At this juncture the plaintiff sued to foreclosure its first
mortgage, to be met by the defense that the tax deed to the Ameri-
can Investment Company cut off the lien of the mortgage. 31 The
plaintiff countered with the argument that the tax deed was in-
valid because proper notice of the expiration of the period of re-
demption had not been served upon the "owner" of the land, the
"owner" being the Mohall State Bank. The court ruled that service
of the notice upon Dalton, the mortgagor, had been sufficient, on the
theory that the Mohall State Bank had not become the "owner" of
the property within the terms of the statute because of the failure
to secure a sheriff's deed in foreclosing its mortgage . The "owner"
for purposes of service was said to be the person who possesses
title of record, even though a superior title may exist which does
not show upon the record.1
2
The canon of strict construction of the statutes regulating re-
demption is reinforced by a rule that statutes relating to the
service of notice are also rigidly construed, and it is clear that in
applying the statutes the court has given them a completely literal
construction.3" Thus, where the sheriff in making service of the
notice of expiration of the period of redemption by mail upon a
non-resident stated in his affidavit of service that he had mailed the
notice to the owner's "last known place of residence" rather than
to the "last known post office address"-the statutory requirement
34
-the service was held void and a subsequently issued tax deed
29. Axt v. Bank of America, 72 N.D. 600, 10 N.W.2d 430 (1943).
30. 53 N.D. 319, 206 N.W. 411 (1925).
31. See Part I of this paper, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 225, at 236-44, for a discussion of this
aspect of the tax deed's operation.
32. See also Larson v. Clough, 55 N.D. 634, 214 N.W. 904 (1927).
33. McDonald v. Abraham, 75 N.D. 457, 28 N.W.2d 582 (1947); Stutsman v.
Smith, 73 N.D. 664, 18 N.W.2d 639 (1945).
34. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2702 (2) (1943).
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was invalid.15 Many cases hold that failure to serve the notice of
the expiration of the period of redemption upon the person in
possession of the land makes the service defective, 6 even in a
case where the tenant himself has secured a tax deed to the proper-
ty and is vigorously asserting the validity of the service!' 7  Similar-
ly, a failure to list the record owner's name correctly in publishing a
notice of the expiration of the period of redemption invalidates the
notice."'
Despite the fact that the requirements of the statutes governing
service of the notice must be strictly observed, the burden of
proving a failure to make valid service rests upon the person as-
serting the invalidity of a tax deed, since the code makes tax deeds
prima facie evidence that all the requirements of law with respect
to the sale have been complied with.30 Indeed, an amendment to
the statutes in 1951 attempted to make this presumption of validity
even stronger: it was provided that a tax deed should be conclusive
evidence of the truth of all facts recited therein, ' thus including
the recital that "proof of legal notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption (has) been filed with the county auditor . . ."41
But it seems highly doubtful that this last statute will ever attain
its objective, since in order to obtain the benefit of the rule of conclu-
siveness it is necessary to prove the possession of a tax deed; and in
order to prove possession of a tax deed, one must show that all the
necessary jurisdictional steps have been taken. A tax deed which
is not jurisdictionally valid is little more than a scrap of paper, and
the fact that a document may be introduced in evidence as a tax
35. Wilke v. Merchants State Bank, 61 N.D. 351, 237 N.W. 810 (1931).
36. Belakion v. Hilstad, 76 N.D. 298, 35 N.W.2d 637 (1949); Mayer v. Ranum,
75 N.D. 548, 30 N.W.2d 608 (1948); Sailer v. Mercer County, 75 N.D. 123, 26
N.W.2d 137 (1947); Werner v. Werner, 74 N.D. 565, 23 N.W.2d 757 (1947); Bumann
v. Burleigh County, 73 N.D. 655, 18 N.W.2d 10 (1945); Schott v. Enander, 73 N.D.
352, 15 N.W.2d 303 (1944); Messer v. Henlein, 72 N.D. 63, 4 N.W.2d 587 (1942);
Anderson v. Roberts, 71 N.D. 345, 1 N.W.2d 338 (1941).
37. This happened in Schott v. Enander, 73 N.D. 352, 15 N.W.2d 303 (1944).
Normally, of course, a tenant cannot question his landlord's title. But it has been held
in this state that a tenant is not estopped from asserting a title adverse to his landlord
upon issues not arising out of the relation of landlord and tenant. Eikevik v. Lee, 73
N.D. 197, 13 N.W.2d 94 (1944); Lincoln Nat. L. Ins. Co. v. Sampson, 61 N.D. 611,
239 N.W. 245 (1931); Hebden v. Bina, 17 N.D. 235, 116 N.W. 85 (1908). Undoubtedly
the plaintiff in Schott v. Enander, supra, felt that in his capacity as tenant in possession
he got much more protection than was good for him in his capacity as possessor of a
hostile title! Where land has been leased and is being farmed by a tenant who does not
live on the land and has no buildings on it, service must be made upon the lessee, since
he is regarded as a "person in possession" within the terms of the statute. Sailer v. Mercer
County, 75 N.D. 123, 26 N.W.2d 137 (1947).
38. Knowlton v. Coye, 76 N.D. 478, 37 N.W.2d 343 (1949).
39. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2429 (1943).
40. N.D. Laws 1951, c. 276, §2.
41. N.D. Rev. Code 157-2706 (1943). In other words,_if the statute were accepted
at face value, the possession of a tax deed would conclusively establish the validity of
all prior proceedings leading up to its issuance, includinig the taking of all the jurisdictional
steps needed to make the tax deed a tax deed in the first place.
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deed does not necessarily make it such; the court has not hesitated
to strike down such "bootstrap" techniques in the past. 42  Be that
as it may, the rule that a tax deed furnishes prima facie evidence
of compliance with the law has been deemed sufficient to require
a holding that where the record does not affirmatively show that
the service of the notice was improper, a tax deed will be held
valid.4 3  And additional protection is given the holder of a tax deed
by the ruling of the court, several times reaffirmed, that where the
requirements of the statute as to service of the notice have been
complied with, the fact that the landowner for whom the notice
was intended did not receive it is immaterial.
4
1
A brief comment of one further aspect of the requirement that
the notice be served on the "owner" of the land involved in a tax
sale may prove worthwhile. It is probable that the statute regulat-
ing service of the notice was drafted in terms of the implicit as-
sumption that a person who is the "owner" of property is a person
who possesses an estate in fee simple absolute. But even a moment's
thought will indicate immediately that the word "owner" does not
possess such a precisely defined meaning, and the question of what
happens when land is held by several persons possessing differing
interests must therefore be considered.
From an analytical standpoint, ownership of land is a matter of
degree, depending for its economic value and legal status on the
quantum of rights, privileges, powers and immunitites which a
holder of an interest in property possesses with respect to that
property as compared with other persons."5 Thus, to return to a
42. If a jurisdictional defect occurs in the proceedings leading up to the issuance
of the purported deed, for instance, it is difficult to see how this statute could become
operative any more than the three year statute of limitations, discussed hereinafter, is set
in motion by the issuance of a tax deed which is invalid because of a jurisdictional defect.
In both cases the meeting of all jurisdictional requirements is necessarily a condition
precedent to the operation of the statutes involved. Thus, every case which has held the
three year statute of limitations inapplicable to purported deeds void for jurisdictional
defects can logically be cited for the proposition that N.D. Laws 1951, c. 276, §2, does
not operate to cure jurisdictional defects. See the topic "Statutes of Limitation," infra.
And compare the treatment given N.D. Rev. Code §57-2429 (1943), in Beggs v. Paine,
15 N.D. 436, 109 N.W. 322 (1906), discussed in the first portion of this paper. Crum,
op cit. supra note 10, at 247-49.
43. Twedt v. Hanson, 58 N.D. 571, 226 N.W. 615 (1929). Cf. Remmich v. Wagner,
77 N.D. 120, 41 N.W.2d 170 (1950).
44. McDonald v. Abraham, 75 N.D. 457, 28 N.W.2d 582 (1947); Coverston v. Grand
Forks County, 74 N.D. 552, 23 N.W.2d 746 (1946); Buman v. Sturn, 73 N.D. 561,
16 N.W.2d 837 (1945); Schott v. Enander, 73 N.D. 352, 15 N.W.2d 303 (1944); Axt
v. Bank of America, 72 N.D. 600, 10 N.W.2d 430 (1943).
45. This is the basic approach popularized by the late Professor Wesley Hohfeld of
the School of Law of Yale University, which has been adopted by the American Law
Institute's Restatement of the Law of Property. Thus, the Restatement of Property defines
the word "owner" as meaning a person who has one or more "interests" in land or
in a thing. Restatement, Property §10 (1936). "The word 'interest' is used . . . both
generically to include varying aggregates of rights, privileges, powers and impnunities,
and distributively to mean any one of them." Restatement, Property §5 (1936). Comment
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case already discussed, 6 consider the situation of a life tenant and
remainderman. Each of these persons is involved in a legal relation-
ship with the other concerning the land which is the subject of their
respective interests;47 each possesses a significant number of legally
protected rights, privileges, powers and immunities concerning it.
Can it be said that either is so completely the "owner" that in the
event of a tax sale service of the notice of expiration of the period of
redemption need not be made on the other? It is submitted that
such a result would be indefensible. Both the life tenant and the
remainderman are "owners" of particular estates in the land; 41 the
interest of each is historically treated as a presently vested interest, 49
assignable, transferrable, and inheritable, the interest of the life
tenant carrying with it the right of possession but certainly not
vesting in him exclusive ownership. One does not own land, as
the common law attorney never tired of pointing out. One owns
merely an estate in land. Therefore, since both the life tenant and
the remainderman have estates in the same property, service of the
notice of expiration of the period of redemption should logically
be made upon both.
If the foregoing argument is accepted, it logically follows that a
further conclusion is necessary. When it is perceived that an "owner"
is simply a person who possesses an interest or estate, not necessarily
exclusive, in a particular tract of land, it follows that any person
having an interest in a tract of land sold at tax sale must be regard-
ed as an "owner" of the land within the terms of the statute regulat-
ing service of the notice.50 This construction of the statute is
c to §10 of the Restatement neatly illustrates the fact that the value of "ownership"
varies according to the number and kind of rights, privileges, powers and immunities
possessed by an "owner" of property: "The owner may part with many of the rights,
powers, privileges and immunities that constitute complete property and his relation to
the thing is still termed ownership both in this restatement and as a matter of popular
usage. Thus an owner of an automobile may mortgage it, or have it subjected to a
mechanic's lien, and still properly be said to be the owner . . . . To just what an .,xtent
either in the case of the ownership of a thing, or of any of the small aggregates of
interests in a thing, the constituent interests can be parted with and the characteristics of
'ownership of the land' . . . be still regarded as existing is not a matter upon which
any precise rule can be laid down."
46. See part I of this paper, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 225, at 242.
47. The essential difference between the two interests is simply that the life tenant
possesses a present and the remainderman a future right to the possession of the land,
the necessity of protecting the interest of the remainderman being regarded as sufficient
to justify the courts in restraining the life tenant from the commission of acts which would
prejudice the future estate of the remainderman.
48. Certainly this is true as the idea of "ownership" is used in the Restatement of
Property. Restatement, Property §10, comment c (1936).
49. The situation of a contingent remainder interest as affected by tax deed proceedings
has already been discussed. Crum, supra note 10, at 243-44.
50. This is the construction which other courts have given to the word "owner" in this
connection. "In construing the redemption laws, the word 'owner' is held to be a generic
term, which embraces the different species of interest which may be carved out of a fee
simple estate. . . . Where land has been mortgaged to secure a debt, and judgment
creditors have liens upon it, and the land is in possession of a stranger to the title,
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reinforced by the fact that any person having an interest in land
is by statute entitled to make redemption of whole property-not
merely his own interest-and also the fact that precisely the rule of
service suggested above has been adopted by the legislature in the
statute governing service of the notice in cases where the tax sale
has been made to the county in the first instance.5
While the statute governing service of the notice in case a county
has purchased the land provides that service is to be made by
registered mail,12 the similar statute in case of a sale' to a private
citizen provides that notice is to be served personally upon the
owner if he is a resident and by registered mail and publication in
a newspaper once each week for three consecutive weeks if he is
not. '  The law of personal service in such instances follows
the cases involving service of other types of process rather closely.
Thus in McKenzie v. Boynton, 4 service of the notice was made by
leaving a copy of it with an employee at the hotel where the land-
owner lived. It was held that this was not a good service of the
notice under the code provision which specifies that if "the defend-
ant cannot be found conveniently service may be made by leaving
a copy of summons at his dwelling house in the presence of one or
more of the members of his family over the age of 14 years, or if
the defendant resides in the family of another, with one of the
members of the family in which he resides over the age of 14
years."5
One further point deserves mention in any discussion of the law
of service concerning the notice of expiration of the period of
redemption. In Axt v. Bank of America,5 land was bid in by a
county at tax sale and the certificate of tax sale was thereafter
assigned to a private buyer. It was argued for the former owner,
assailing the validity of the notice of expiration of the period of re-
demption, that since the private buyer was a mere assignee of the
each is an 'owner' according to the extent of his interest or claim, and each has a right
to protect his interest by a redemption from a tax sale. . . . Any right which in law or
equity amounts to an ownership in the land; any right of entry upon it, to its possession
or engagement, or any part of which may be deemed an estate, makes the person an
owner as far as it is necessary to give him the right to redeem." Adams v. Beale, 19
Iowa 61, 68 (1865), followed in Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Kraschel, 222 Iowa
128, 266 N.W. 550 (1936). A voluminous collection of cases construing the word
"owner" is found in 30 Words and Phrases 604 et seq. (Perm. ed. 1940).
51. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2802 (1943); Id. §57-2804. The extent of the right of
redemption enjoyed by persons possessing less than complete and'undivided ownership of
land is discussed in the pages following, under the heading "Effect of Redemption."
52. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2804 (1943).
53. Id. §57-2702 (2).
54. 19 N.D. 531, 125 N.W. 1059 (1910).
55. N.D. Rev. Code §28-0610 (1943).
56. 72 N.D. 600, 10 N.D.2d 430 (1943).
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county, the procedure followed in making out and serving the
notice should have been that prescirbed for the county by the
statutes. The court, however, ruled that "after a tax certificate has
been assigned by the county to a private party, the sufficiency of
the notice of expiration of redemption and the legality of the service
thereof must be determined under the statutes applicable to tax
certificates held by private individuals."
B. ERRORS OCCURmNG IN BODY OF NOTICE
Whether the notice of expiration of the period of redemption is
issued on behalf of a private purchaser or on behalf of a county, the
contents of the notice are basically the same. The essential elements
which must appear in the notice are (a) a description of the land;
(b) a statement of the amount for which it was sold; (c) a state-
ment of the amount required to redeem from the sale, exclusive
of the costs accruing upon the issuance of the notice; and (d) the
time when the period of redemption will terminate."7 Of course,
as indicated in the preceding section, the notice must be addressed
to the correct person or it will be invalid."'
The cases involving the notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption have generally involved one or more of these ele-
ments, since a material error in the description of the land, the
amount necessary to redeem, or the time when the period of re-
demption will terminate is sufficient to avoid it. Very often an
attack on the notice will be leveled at all of these elements, as
witness the case of DeNault v. Hoerr,"' in which the notice was
attacked on the grounds that: (1) it failed to describe the land
properly; (2) it failed to set forth the amount required to redeem
correctly; (3) it failed to correctly state the time within which
redemption had to be made; (4) it had not been properly served
on the record owner; (5) it had not been properly served upon the
occupants of the property; and (6) the service had not been prop-
erly attested by proof filed with the county auditor. While the
court upheld the notice, the attack leveled against it in that case
was so comprehensive that the asserted errors listed above could
virtually serve a checklist of potential danger spots in such notices.
1. Problems of Description
Some discussion of the problems involved in describing land
with sufficient precision to meet the rigid standards iriposed by the
57. N.D. Rev. Code J§57-2702 (1), 57-2805 (1943).
58. Tronsrud v. Farm Land Finance Co., 20 N.D. 567, 129 N.W. 359 (1910).
59. 66 N.D. 82, 262 N.W. 361 (1935).
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court in tax sale cases has already appeared under the topic of
"Assessment" in the preceding portion of this paper.60 The con-
clusion drawn, it will be recalled, was that errors of description ap-
pearing in the assessment roll probably should not be sufficient to
invalidate a tax sale unless it could be affirmatively shown that the
errors were prejudicial.
The same principle logically ought to apply to errors in descrip-
tion appearing in the notice of expiration of the period of redemp-
tion. Nevertheless, a relatively recent decision indicates that the des-
cription of land in such notices may serve to invalidate them. In
Star v. Norsteby,"1 decided in 1948, the following description was
used in a notice: "WSE SWME, Lot 2, Section 4, Township 158,
Range 94." The correct description would have been: the west
half of the southeast quarter (W% SEi), the southwest quarter of
the northeast quarter (SW3i NEL), and lot two (2) of section four
(4) in township one hundred fifty-eight (158) north of range ninety-
four (94) west of the fifth principal meridian.
While the absence of numerical fractions after the letters in the
description did not invalidate the notice,62 the court held that
the description was insufficient because the typographical error
which resulted in the description of the southwest quarter of the
northeast quarter being given as "SWME" instead of "SW NE"
invalidated it. The court said that such a description was "not a
description at all . . . . The fact that the plaintiff, knowing the
description of his land, might make use of the knowledge and
assume that the correct description was intended does not cure
the error."
' 6 3
Other cases have reached the same result. In Blessett v. Turcotte"
it was held that a tax deed was void where the notice of the expira-
tion of the period of redemption described the land as lying in
section 2 rather than section 20. And it has been held that where
several tracts are sold separately but belong to the same owner,
although a single notice of expiration of the period of redemption
may be issued, it must describe each parcel separately and state
the amount necessary to redeem each iidividual tract separately
and is void where it does not do so.6 5
60. See Part I of this paper, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. at 254-55.
61. 75 N.D. 563, 30 N.W.2d 718 (1948).
62. N.D. Rev. Code §57-0202 (4) (7) (1943); DeNault v. Hoerr, 66 N.D. 82,
262 N.W. 361 (1935).
63. Star v. Norsteby, 75 N.D. 563, 567, 30 N.W.2d 718, 720 (1943).
64. 20 N.D. 151, 127 N.W. 505 (1910).
65. Trustee Loan Co. v. Botz, 37 N.D. 230, 164 N.W. 14 (1917); Davidson v.
Kepner, 37 N.D. 198, 163 N.W. 831 (1917).
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2. Problems of Amount
The amount necessary to redeem from a tax sale must be stated
with substantial accuracy in a notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption, or the notice is invalid. The code provision govern-
ing, the computation of the necessary amount provides that, "The
county auditor shall include in the notice of the expiration of the
period of redemption all real estate taxes, where three or more
years have expired from the date of the original, or any subsequent
tax sale certificate, issued or deemed to have been issued at the
time of the service of such notice, but such notice shall show separ-
ately the amount of delinquent taxes, with penalties and interest,
due for each year, and the total amount which is required to be
paid in effect a redemption of the real estate from such tax deed
proceedings."" '
The cases indicate that this section is often misinterpreted by
county officials, who tend to disregard the rule that a delinquent
tax should not be included in the notice unless it is represented
by a tax sale certificate which has been outstanding for three years
at the time the notice is issued. This is made manifest by such cases
as Robertson v. Brown 7 in which the county auditor issued a
notice on January 21, 1938. The amount stated as necessary for
redemption was $510.53. This sum was arrived at by computing
the sum of the taxes, penalties and interest Which had accrued
with respect to the land involved between the years 1930 to 1936-
the delinquent taxes for 1936, of course, not having been delinquent
for three years at the time the notice. was issued. The court stated,
in striking down the notice, that "The notice of expiration of the
period of redemption may not include tax sales certificates issued
or deemed to have been issued to the county within three years
next preceding the date of notice . The inclusion . . . renders the
tax deed proceedings void."s
In Morehouse v. Paulson,6 involving the same question, the tax
deed holder made the ingenious argument that the inclusion of taxes
which had not been delinquent for the required period of time
in the notice of the expiration of the period of redemption simply
represented information of courtesy, given by the county auditor to
save the owner of the land the trouble of looking up the records
66. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2803 (1943). The foregoing statute prescribes the contents
of the notice when issued on behalf of a county. When the notice is issued on behalf of
a private purchaser, the procedure is prescribed by §§57-2702 and 57-2703, but is
basically similar to that outlined above.
67. 75 N.D. 109, 25 N.W.2d 781 (1947).
68. Id. at 116, 25 N.W.2d at 796.
69. 75 N.D. 525, 28 N.W.2d 608 (1947).
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himself, and that the taxpayer should be presumed to know what
taxes ought to be paid in order to effect a redemption. Support
for this argument may be found in some of the cases, since it has
been held that where the notice contains more information than
is required by law and the information is beneficial
and not harmful, the notice is not invalidated.70 However, the
taxes which had not been delinquent the required period of time
were included in the amount which the notice informed the tax-
payer had to be paid in order to redeem, and this fact caused the
court to invalidate the notice.
A further point raised in Morehouse v. Paulson also deserves
attention. The landowner in that case had failed to pay hail indem-
nity taxes for several of the years in question and when the notice
of expiration of the period of redemption was issued the amount of
these taxes was also included in the total amount demanded for re-
demption. It was argued for the landowner that the inclusion of
the hail indemnity taxes lumped in with the general taxes in the
notice invalidated the notice, and the court upheld this contention.
A few words of explanation may serve to clarify the basis of the
latter ruling. Hail indemnity taxes were first imposed in 1919 after
the approval in 1918 of a constitutional amendment permitting the
state to establish an insurance fund to protect the owners of growing
crops against damage by hail.-1 Thereafter the court ruled in
Davis v. McLean County,72 the first case in which the effect of hail
indemnity taxes came before it, that the lien of such taxes was not
entitled to priority over the lien of a mortgage executed prior
to the enactment of the tax, arguing that the hail indemnity levy
was not a tax in the constitutional sense because its payment by
landowners was voluntary in character. For some time it was
thought that this decision applied only to liens obtained prior to
the enactment of the hail tax, but in State v. Johnson, ' decided in
1926, the court ruled otherwise, holding that a mortgagee was
entitled to redeem from a tax sale for delinquent general and hail
taxes by tendering only the amount of the delinquent general taxes.
The case dealt with a mortgage executed after the enactment of the
hail tax legislation and gave general taxes priority over mortgage
liens but made the lien of hail taxes inferior to that of mortgages
executed before the hail tax lien attached.
70. See Kelsch v. Miller, 73 N.D. 405, 15 N.W.2d 433, 135 A.L.R. 1186 (1944).
71. See N.D. Laws 1919, c. 160; N.D. Const. Amendments, Art. 24.
72. 52 N.D. 857, 204 N.W. 459 (1925).
73. 54 N.D. 184, 208 N.W. 966 (1926).
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Faced with this holding, which seriously impaired the ability of
the county to sell mortgaged land to private purchasers at tax
Sales, 4 the legislature in 1931 enacted legislation providing that
delinquent general taxes and hail indemnity taxes were to be adver-
tised in the same notice of tax sale, but were to be separately stated
and sold separately.75  Two years later it remedied the situation
still further by providing specifically that the lien of hail taxes was
to take priority over all private liens on land which came into exis-
tence after March 7, 1933.76 This legislation was upheld as con-
stitutional, 77 with the result that hail taxes were placed on a sub-
stantially equal footing with general property taxes so far as tax
sales were concerned.
Yet it remained true that in the contemplation of the court, hail
taxes were not taxes in the constitutional sense; and under the
influence of this idea, and the statute prescribing separate sales
where delinquent real estate taxes were coupled with delinquent
hail taxes, the court ruled in Federal Land Bank v. Johnson78 that
it was possible for a taxpayer to pay either the general taxes
on his land or the hail indemnity taxes without regard to whether
he also paid the other. Having reached that result, the logical
next step for the court was the holding in Morehouse v. Paulson
that it is erroneous to list hail indemnity taxes with general property
taxes in setting forth the amount required to redeem from a tax
sale. The proper method appears to be to list the hail indemnity
taxes separately in the notice of expiration of the period of redemp-
tion, although the court did not indicate any views as to the proper
procedure in Morehouse v. Paulson.79  But this would be the logi-
cal solution, since it carries through a statutory scheme which re-
quires general and hail indemnity taxes to be separately stated in
74. To illustrate the reason for this result, assume a typical situation. Blackacre is
owned by A, and B has a first mortgage on it. A owed $100 in general taxes and $25
in hail indemnity taxes, having made default in payment after the execution of the
mortgage to B. The land was sold at tax sale to C, who paid $125 for it. B then
undertook to foreclose his mortgage and made redemption from the tax sale by paying
C $100 plus interest. This redemption would be successful, since the foreclosure of B's
mortgage lien cut off the lien of the hail taxes. Since C thus lost $25, few purchasers
were willing to buy at tax sales while this holding was in effect.
75. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2411 (1943).
76. Id. §26-2235.
77. Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation v. Falk, 67 N.D. 154, 270 N.W. 885 (1937).
78. 67 N.D. 534, 274 N.W. 668 (1937).
79. It would seem possible, since the court has ruled that hail indemnity taxes now
constitute a prior lien in precisely the same manner as general taxes, Federal Farm
Mortgage Corporation v. Falk, 67 N.D. 154, 270 N.W. 885 (1937), to simplify the
statutory treatment of the subject by providing that hail taxes and general taxes are
to be sold together henceforth and must be redeemed together. In the light of the Federal
Farm Mortgage Corporation case, Supra, the provisions of Section 57-2411 of the Code
are really no longer needed.
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the notice of tax sale and delinquent real estate list, and to be sold
separately.
791
Closely analogous to the legal status of hail indemnity taxes is
that of special assessments. Like hail taxes, these are not consider-
ed taxes in the full sense of the term; instead, the court has defined
them as payments made in return for special benefits. The code
provides that property in which special assessments have become
delinquent is to be sold in precisely the same manner as property
on which general taxes are unpaid.71b And in addition, the code
furnishes a remarkable contrast in the manner of handling special
assessments as compared to hail indemnity taxes; it is specifically
proved that delinquent general taxes and special assessments shall
be sold in one sum.
70'
In an early decision involving special assessments, the court
struck down a tax sale in which general taxes and a special assess-
ment had been sold together.79d But that case was decided on the
basis of a statute which required separate sales in such instances,
since amended; and the case would not deserve mention here if it
were not for the fact that in the syllabus of the opinion it was
suggested that such a tax sale violated constitutional principles.
While the statute on which the case was decided has been changed,
the constitution has not, and possibly the case might be cited in
the future for that reason, should a controversy involving special
assessments arise. But the opinion contained scant discussion of
the constitutional point, and in view of the general presumption of
constitutionality surrounding legislative enactments, it is probable
that the statute would be sustained should the validity of lump
sum sales of special assessments and delinquent general taxes be
questioned today.
The problems involved in determining the correct amount to be
listed in the notice of expiration of the period of redemption which
have been discussed thus far are problems which have arisen be-
cause of disputes over the application of the laws governing the
computation of the amount which the notice of expiration of the
period of redemption demands of a delinquent taxpayer. In
short, they have all been errors of law rather than arithmetic.
Where the error in amount is simply clerical, however, the court
has apparently reached its decision on the question of whether the
79a. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2411 (1943).
79b. N.D. Rev. Code §40-2501 (1943).
79c. Id. §40-2502.
79d. Trustee Loan Co. v. Botz, 37 N.D. 230, 164 N.W. 14 (1917).
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error invalidates the notice by determining whether the error is
substantially prejudicial. Thus in one case where the amount neces-
sary to redeem was overstated 77 cents, the court held the error
immaterial."0 In another instance an error in a subtotal of the notice,
whereby $47.75 was listed as $477.05, was held non-prejudicial
where the total amount was given correctly." Conversely, in an
early decision the court set aside a tax deed where a 96 cent error
occurred in the notice, holding the overstatement prejudicial.
8 2
Where an error occurs by means of which the amount necessary
for redemption is understated rather than overstated, the notice is
normally upheld. 1:1 The statutes provide that in the event an over-
statement occurs and redemption is made, proof that the sum paid
was less than the sum actually due does not invalidate the redemp-
tion."' Instead the county auditor is liable for the deficiency but
has a right of action over against the redemptioner to recover from
him the amount he must make up out of his own pocket.85
Where the notice of expiration of the period of redemption in-
cludes taxes already the subject of tax sale, from which redemption
has been made, the error in amount resulting is of course sufficient
to invalidate the notice."0
C. EFFECT OF REDEMPTION
The right to redeem from a tax sale is not limited solely to de-
linquent taxpayers. It often happens that ownership of land is
divided among several persons, one or more of whom may possess
a primary obligation to pay taxes in order to protect the interests
of the others. To limit the right of redemption narrowly might
80. Baird v. Zahl, 58 N.D. 388, 226 N.W. 549 (1929). In Munroe v. Donovan, 31
N.D. 228, 153 N.W. 461 (1915), app. dismissed, 245 U.S. 679 (1917), in which an
understatement of the amount necessary to redeem of 12 cents was held non-prejudicial.
81. Kelsch v. Miller 73 N.D. 405, 15 N.W.2d 433, 135 A.L.R. 1186 (1944).
82. Lee v. Crawford, 10 N.D. 482, 88 N.W. 97 (1901). Does this indicate that the
magic line on one side of which an error in amount is prejudicial and on the other side
of which it is not falls between 77 and 96 cents? Probably not. The individual equities in
each case would probably have to be taken into account.
83. Munroe v. Donovan, 31 N.D. 228, 153 N.W. 461 (1915), app. dismissed, 245
U.S. 679 (1917). In McDonald v. Abraham 75 N.D. 457, 28 N.W.2d 582 (1947),
the plaintiff argued that a notice of the expiration of the period of redemption was invalid
because it placed the amount which he had to pay to redeem the land at too small a
sum. The land was sold for taxes several times, the last sale occurring in December,
1939, for the unpaid taxes of 1938. The notice of expiration of the period of redemption
was issued early in 1942. The plaintiff contended that the sum of the 1938 taxes should
have been included in the notice. The court ruled against this contention, with what
appears to have been obvious correctness. If the 1938 taxes had been included in the
notice, such cases as Robertson v. Brown and Morehouse v. Paulson, discussed above in
the text, would have invalidated the notice. Moreover, as the discussion which follows
in the text indicates, the statutes presecribe another procedure to be followed where
the sum of money needed for redemption is understated in the notice.
84. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2607 (1943).
85. Ibid.
86. Heie& v. Olson, 75 N.D. 541, 30 N.W.2d 613 (1947).
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therefore tend to prejudice such persons as remaindermen, mort-
gagees, co-tenants and the like, in cases where the obligation to
pay taxes is a thing apart from the ownership of the land.
In consequence, the statutes extend the right of redemption to any
person or corporation having an interest in the land, even though
the interest may have been acquired after the tax sale took place. 
7
Similarly the right extends to heirs, devisees, creditors and the
executor or administrator of a landowner who dies after the oc-
currence of a tax sale."" In certain cases, the question of how
much of the land may be redeemed from a tax sale has become of
considerable importance, and it seems worthwhile to take up the
cases which have dealt with this question.
1. Cotenancy
The logical starting point is Sailer v. Mercer County, 11 a case
decided in 1947. The salient facts of that controversy were briefly
these:
The land involved was held by a widow in life tenancy with
vested remainders outstanding in her children. The land was
purchased by Mercer County at a tax sale and notice of the expira-
tion of the period of redemption was issued, redemption was not
made, and a tax deed was issued to the county. Shortly after this
occurred, the plaintiff acquired a quitclaim deed to the interest of
one of the remaindermen. He then brought an action asserting the
invalidity of the notice of expiration of the period of redemption,
pointing out that at the time the notice was issued the land had
been leased for farming purposes and arguing that service of the
notice should have been made upon the lessee. There were no
buildings on the property but the court ruled that the lessee was
nevertheless a "person in possession" of the land within the mean-
ing of the statute regulating service of the notice. Accordingly the
service was held invalid.0
In the meantime the life tenant had died, leaving the plaintiff
free to assert a right of possession under his deed from the re-
mainderman. He was also free, in view of the invalidity of the
notice of expiration of the right of redemption, to redeem from the
tax sale, and he took the position that he was entitled to redeem the
entire tract. The defense was the argument that the plaintiff was
87. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2602 (1943).
88. Ibid.
89. 75 N.D. 123, 26 N.W.2d 137 (1947).
90. Accord, Schott v. Enander, 73 N.D. 352, 15 N.W.2d 303 (1944); Anderson v.
Roberts, 71 N.D. 345, 1 N.W. 2d 338 (1941).
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entitled only to redeem his own interest, two-elevenths of the whole,
and § 57-2605 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 was cited
in support of this view:
Any person who has or claims an interest in or lien upon an
undivided share of any piece or parcel of land sold may redeem
such undivided share of such land by paying to the county
treasurer an amount proportionate to the amount rYequired to
redeem the whole of such land ....
A dissenting opinion agreed with the contention that this statute
was controlling and limited the plaintiff to redemption of his own
interest only. It Was pointed out that the statute cited was borrowed
from Minnesota, and asserted that the Minnesota construction was
the owner of the an undivided interest could redeem only his own
estate, not the whole property.91 But the answer of the majority
of the court was that the plaintiff was not attempting to make re-
demption under the provisions of § 57-2605 but under the provisions
of § 57-2602, which stipulates that "any" person having "an interest"
may redeem, without further qualification. What the majority said,
in effect, was that the holder of an undivided interest has an option:
he may redeem only his own share of the property, paying a pro-
portionate share of the taxes, or alternatively he may redeem the
entire tract, paying the full amount of the taxes.
While the point is a close and knotty one, the position of the
majority seems the sounder. The statutes obviously contain pro-
visions conferring both a general and special right of redemption,
and the majority could point to a rule of construction stipulating
that such provisions are to be construed in such a manner as to give
effect to both of them if possible.9 2  Moreover, the language of
§57-2605 is permissive in character: it says that the owner of an
undivided interest "may" redeem his own share. There is nothing
which says he "shall" or "must" do so, to the exclusion of other
interests. The language of the statute itself thus reconciles readily
to the "option" point of view.
But in addition it may be pointed out that the view of the majority
in reality takes nothing away from the tax sale certificate holder.
If one holder of an undivided interest is entitled to redeem, the
rest will normally also be entitled to do so. If the right of redemp-
91. The case principally relied on by the dissent was Goodrich v. Florer, 27 Minn.
100, 6 N.W. 452 (1880), construing Minn. Stat. 1878, c. 11, J§91, 92. The case
involved an attempt by an insane person to redeem the entire property from a tax sale,
through her co-tenants could not have redeemed in their own right, and strikingly
resembles McDonald v. Abraham discussed in the text immediately following. It can be
distinguished from Sailer v. Mercer County on the same grounds pointed out with respect to
McDonald v. Abraham.
92. N.D. Rev. Code §1-0207 (1943).
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tion persists as to one, it persists as to all,9"2 at least in the ordinary
case. To allow one cotenant to redeem the entire property is no
harder on the certificate holder than to allow all the cotenants to
accomplish the same thing by individual redemption of their indi-
vidual shares. In either instance the certificate holder receives
precisely the same amount of compensation.
The rule thus laid down next came before the court in McDonald
v. Abraham,a and an important qualification was written into it.
The plaintiffs, an adult and two minor children, inherited a tract
of land from their grandfather. At the time of the inheritance the
land had been sold for taxes and a certificate of tax sale had been
issued to Barnes County. A notice of the expiration of the period
of redemption was issued and a tax deed was eventually obtained
by the county, which then sold the land to the defendants.
Three years later the plaintiffs sued jointly to determine the
ownership of the land, taking the position that since two of them
were minors they had a right to redeem at any time up to a period
of three years after coming of age.94 The court agreed with the
plaintiffs that the minor children, because of their disability, were
in a position to assert a right to redeem. The question which then
naturally raised itself was whether they could redeem the whole
tract, including the portion held by the adult plaintiff. The court
ruled they could not do so ,their right to redemption being limited
to the two-thirds share they held in their own right.9" Superficially
the result would seem inconsistent with the decision in Sailer v.
Mercer County, and it is surprising to note that the latter case was
not even cited in the opinion. When the two cases are carefully
compared, however, it is possible to draw a clear distinction be-
tween them. Sailer v. Mercer County involved a situation in which
each of the cotenants could have redeemed in his own right, if he
had wished to do so, because the error which extended the right
of redemption left it unimpaired as to all of them. But McDonald v.
Abraham involved no such case; the right of redemption persisted
in the case of two children only because of a specific statutory pro-
vision and to allow it to extend the entire tract would have been to
92a. Werner v. Werner, 74 N.D. 565, 23 N.W.2d 757 (1947).
93. 75 N.D. 457, 28 N.W.2d 582 (1947).
94. "Any minor, insane person, or person in captivity in any country with which the
United States is at war, having an estate in or lien upon land sold for taxes, may redeem
the same within three years after his disability ceases, but in such cases the right to
redeem must be established in a suit for that purpose brought against the party holding
the title under sale." N.D. Rev. Code §57-2604 (1943).
95. Accord, Goodrich v. Florer, 27 Minn. 100, 6 N.W. 452 (1880), discussed supra
note 91.
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extend indirectly to the adult cotenant a right of redemption which
could not have been exercised directly. The two cases, read to-
gether, appear to stand for the proposition, that the owner of an
undivided interest may normally redeem the entire tract. so long
as his cotenants could redeem their own interests individually;
where they cannot do so, redemption is apparently limited to the
cotenants own portion.
2. Mortgagees
As between a mortgagor and mortgagee, it is well settled that the
mortgagor is under the primary duty of paying taxes. 96 Where
he does not do so, and the mortgagee pays the taxes in order to
protect the property from tax sale, he is entitled to add the amount
of taxes paid to the amount of his lien.97 Likewise, where a tax
sale has occurred, the mortgagee has the right to redeem from it.
The general rule is that redemption by a mortgagee simply en-
titles him to add the amount paid to accomplish the redemption
to the sum of the mortgage debt,9Y This is, in some respects, an
unusual result; one would suppose that the mortgagee, by redeem-
ing, would find himself subrogated to the rights of the tax sale pur-
chaser. However, the courts have generally ruled that a tax title held
by a mortgagee cannot be asserted against a mortgagor, 9 and the
only effect of a redemption from a tax sale by a mortgagee is there-
fore an increase in the size of the mortgage lien.
The holding that a mortgage may not assert a tax title as against
a mortgagor was first made in North Dakota in 1902 in Finlayson v.
Peterson,' and has been followed ever since. The case involved a
situation in which a mortgagee had acquired several tax deeds to
land covered by his mortgage and thereafter transferred these
tax deeds to a third party by virtue of them. The court held that
"under such a state of facts a trust relation arises in which the
mortgagee or his grantee becomes a trustee and as such is not
only debarred from acquiring title himself as against the trustor
but is under an obligation to pay the taxes as a means of protecting
the trust property against a hostile title."1°1
Whether the trust theory enunciated in the foregoing statement
rests on sound ground seems questionable. Tiffany states flatly that
96. 4 Am. Law of Property 198 (1952).
97. N.D. Rev. Code §57-4502 (1943).
98. For collections of cases dealing with this situation, see Notes, 84 A.L.R. 1366
(1936); 123 Id. 1248 (1939).
99. 5 Tiffany, Real Property §1425 (3d ed. 1939).
100. 11 N.D. 45, 89 N.W. 855 (1902).
101. Id. at 53, 89 N.W. at 859.
A COMMENTARY ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES.
no such fiduciary relationship exists between mortgagor
and mortgagee, x 2  and adds that, "The more satisfactory
ground . . . appears to be that, it being for the advantage of the
state that taxes be promptly paid, and the right to purchase at tax
sale being unnecessary for the protection of the mortgagee, it is
against public policy to allow the mortgagee, by leaving the taxes
unpaid, to acquire a tax title and so save the costs of foreclosure."13
But even this explanation seems doubtful. Why there should be a
public policy against saving mortgagees the costs of foreclosure is
difficult to see.
However, the rule is firmly established in this state. In Baird v.
Fischer,104 the court referred to it with evident approval, and held
that a second mortgagee could not assert a tax title against a first
mortgagee who had already foreclosed his first lien, where the
second mortgagee retained a right of redemption from the fore-
closure of the first mortgage. The court seemed to feel that the
situation of the two mortgagees was analogous to that of tenants
in common. While the mortgagor himself had the primary duty
to pay taxes, it was asserted that the duty also rested upon the
mortgagees in case of a default by the mortgagor. Otherwise the,
state would simply sell the land and wipe out the interests of all
the parties. A dissenting member of the court was not impressed
by this reasoning and saw no reason for holding that the junior
mortgagee occupied a position of trust with respect to the holder
of the senior mortgage.
Where a mortgagor has failed to pay taxes and a third party has
purchased the land at tax sale and obtained a valid tax deed, a
mortgagee may purchase the land with no fear that his purchase
will accrue to the benefit of the former mortgagor. The trust
theory ceases to be applicable in such a situation. In the one case
on the point in this state, it was said that "The mortgage lien being
extinguished, the mortgagee or his successor in interest no longer
stood in any relation of trust or confidence with respect to the
property and was as free to bargain for its purchase as though the
mortgage never existed."10
5
D. THE RiGHT OF REPURCHASE
The right to redeem from a tax sale ends with the issuance of
a properly drawn and served notice of the expiration of the period
102. 5 Tiffany, Real Property §1413 (3d ed. 1939).
103. Tiffany, supra note 102,, §1425.
104. 57 N.D. 167, 220 N.W. 892 (1928).
105. Williams v. Campion, 53 N.D. 456, 206 N.W. 703 (1925).
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of redemption and the running of the time specified therein. There-
after the holder of the tax sale certificate is entitled to go into pos-
session of the property and to obtain a tax deed. In the case
where land has been purchased at a tax sale by a private buyer,
this normally completes the tax sale trarisaction; the land now
belongs to the buyer in fee simple absolute, and he may deal with
it as he chooses. But in the event the land has been purchased
by the county, the issuance of a tax deed to the county is only
the first step in a further statutory process for the disposition of
the property.
Obviously, a county is rarely in a position to operate the land
itself and there is no reason why it should attempt to do so, al-
though where difficulty is encountered in reselling the property
it may be leased or rented. " ' The statutes therefore provide that an
annual sale of land to which the county has acquired tax deeds shall
be conducted on the third Tuesday in November of each year, 0 at
which time the land may be sold to the highest bidder.108 Prior
to the annual sale the land must be appraised by the board of
county commissioners, which is authorized to fix a minimum sale
,price for the property,, 0 subject to the right of the various agencies
which had a hand in levying taxes on the land in the first instance
to protest the valuation thus made if in their judgment it is too
low.11
0
It is the resale of the property which finally terminates the tax
sale transaction so far as the county is concerned. The entire tax
sale transaction has as its primary objective the raising of revenue,
and it is only through the resale of the tax-forfeited property that
the county may convert its title into cash. It may happen, of course,
that no one will offer to purchase the land at the annual sale. In
106. Rosenstein v. Williams County, 73 N.D. 363, 15 N.W.2d 378 (1944).
107. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2813 (1943).
108. This sale should not be confused with the sale which initiates the process of
acquiring a tax title in the first instance. The original tax sale amounts simply to an
assignment of delinquent tax moneys owing to the county, coupled with a lien which the
tax sale purchaser is entitled to foreclose if redemption from the sale is not made. The
sale under discussion now is held to dispose of land, the title to which has already been
acquired by the county through the process of foreclosing the lien for taxes.
109. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2810 (1943). This statute provides that the price fixed
shall be sufficient to cover all special assessments, hail indemnity taxes, penalties, interest
and costs levied against the property. However, where the board concludes that the
market value of the property is less than the amount of these imposts, the board may
set a lesser amount as the minimum sale price. Incidentally, it was held in Flath v.
Elefson, 73 N.D. 746, 19 N.W.2d 571 (1945), that the assessed value originally placed
on the land for the purposes of taxation could not be shown to have been erroneous
through proof of the fact that when the county later sold the land it fixed a minimum
sale price less than the assessed value of the land. The court held that the valuation
methods used in fixing the sale price were distinct from those used in fixing the size of
the tax load, and neither controlled the other.
110. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2811 (1943).
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this event the statutes provide that the land may be sold privately
or reoffered at the succeeding annual sale.-'
During the period after title has been lost but prior to resale, the
former owner of the land retains one important right. So long as
the title to the tract remains in the county, he may exercise a
statutory option to repurchase the land, 1 2 being entitled to thirty
days notice of any anticipated private sale. This right is obviously
closely similar to a right of redemption, and for purposes of this
discussion it seems convient to treat it under that heading; but
the court has often pointed out that the extension of this right
to the former owner makes him simply a preferred purchaser en-
titled to take back the land without profit to the county."'
On several occasions, contests have arisen over the precise ap-
plication of the section of the code granting this right to the former
owner. Since the right persists, in the language of the statute,
"so long as the tax title . . . remains in the county,"', it is clearly
important to determine precisely when the county loses title. This
point has been the subject of somewhat conflicting adjudications.
It was said in Lyche v. Steele County,," that the rules governing
the annual sale are those governing any other auction-or at least
closely analogous - and the contract of sale is completed
when the bid of the prospective purchaser is accepted.
Since under the law of this state the making of a contract for the
sale of land operates to pass equitable title to the purchaser im-
mediately," ' the case appears to stand for the proposition that the
passage of equitable title is sufficient to cut off the right to re-
purchase. A similar ruling was made in Horab v. Williams County,"
l7
decided in 1945, in which it was held that once a purchaser has
made the high bid at an annual sale and it has been accepted, the
board of county commissioners is thereafter without power to re-
quire the purchaser to follow' the procedure specified by the code
for the case where land is sold to a private purchaser.""
In Coverston v. Grand Forks County,"0 a different result was
111. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2817 (1943).
112. Id. §57-2818.
113. Rosenstein v. Williams County, 73 N.D. 363, 15 N.W.2d 378 (1944). It may
be pointed out that at one time the right of repurchase was called a right of redemption
in the statutes. N.D. Laws 1939, c. 238.
114. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2819 (1943).
115. 72 N.D. 238, 6 N.W.2d 92 (1942).
116. Clapp v. Tower, 11 N.D. 446, 93 N.W. 862 (1903).
117. 73 N.D. 754, 19 N.W.2d 649 (1945).
118. In this particular instance, it was ruled that the former owner of the land could
not assert a right to repurchase the land after receiving a thirty-day notice of private sale,
since the thirty-day notice provision applicable to private sales could not be applied to
the annual sale at auction.
119.-74 N.D. 552, 23 N.W.2d.746 (1946).
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reached. The purchaser in that case made the high bid for a piece
of property at the annual sale, one-fourth of the purchase price
being paid by check at the time. He also signed a contract for
deed which was, however, never signed by the chairman of the
board of county commissioners or the county auditor. Three days
later he offered to pay the balance of the price in cash. This offer
was approved by the board of county commissioners. On the
same day the chairman of the board and the county auditor exe-
cuted a deed from Grand Forks county running to the purchaser,
and the deed was left with the county auditor to be delivered to
the purchaser. Before this deed was actually delivered, but while
the purchaser was waiting for it, an attorney for the former owner
tendered to the county auditor the sum needed to repurchase the
property. Though the deed was thereafter delivered, it was held,
that the delivery was ineffective and that the repurchase was valid.
It may be sugested that the court was aparently influenced by the
fact that the failure of the former owner to redeem sooner had been
due to oversight. The case nevertheless holds that under some
circumstances repurchase may be effected by the former owner so
long as the deed running to the purchaser from the county has
not actually been delivered.120
An interesting contention concerning the effect of a repurchase
was advanced in Rosenstein v. Williams County.121 The county
leased a tract of land under an arrangement whereby it was to
receive a portion of the crop as compensation. When the former
owner thereafter repurchased the property, he demanded that the
lessee turn over to him the share of the crop which would pre-
viously have gone to the county. It was held that he was justified
in this demand and the county's argument that it was entitled
to the lessor's share was overruled.
One further point may be added concerning the right of re-
purchase. When once a county has acquired title to land through
tax forfeiture, the former owner has constructive notice of the date
on which the annual sale is to be held from the statutes themselves,
and public notice is given in addition. Moreover, if the property
is sold at private sale the former owner is entitled to a thirty-day
period of grace before the sale is completed within which to re-
purchase. Normally, therefore, he receives ample warning that his
right of repurchase is to be terminated. But the code also contains
120. See also Cary v. Morton County, 57 N.D. 700, 233 N.W. 928 (1929) (an
analogous situation).
121. 73 N.D. 363, 15 N.W.2d 378 (1944).
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a provision permitting a county to transform such land into a
county or municipal park or recreation area, without notice to
the former owner.'2 '2  Under this statute, the right of the former
owner to repurchase the property may be extinguished without
notice to him, -121 though this will obviously happen only rarely.
VI. STATUTES OF LIMITATION AND CURATIVE STATUTES
In the opening pages of this discussion, mention was made of
the general distrust which the members of the legal profession have
felt in the past concerning tax deeds. Among methods utilized in
the recurring attempts to strengthen them may be listed such
devices as the enactment of short statutes of limitation with re-
spect to actions attacking the validity of tax titles, ' 24 the enactment
of curative legislation, "" and the adoption of statutes declaring
the unassailability of tax titles except for defects in the proceedings
specifically enumerated212 To this list of these enactments may
be added those statutes imposing what may be termed procedural
or evidentiary disabilities, i.e., statutes providing that there shall be
a prima facie presumption of validity with respect to tax deeds ,127
or even attempting to make the presumption conclusive." '
Most of these topics have already been dealt with, but there
remain for consideration the effect of statutes of limitation upon
actions involving tax titles and the effect of curative legislation.
A. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
There are three statutes of limitation potentially applicable to
actions involving the validity of tax deeds. One of these prescribes
122. N.D. Rev. Code §11-2708 (1943).
123. Bloomdale v. Rutland, 74 N.D. 651, 24 N.W.2d 38 (1946).
124. These have been widely adopted in many states, and represent a common method
of attempting to protect tax titles. See, e.g., Ala. Code §51-295 (1940); Ark. Stat.
Ann. §48-1118 (1947); Mont. Rev. Code §2214 (1935); N.C. Gen. Stat. §1-52 (1943);
N.D. Rev. Code §57-4511 (1943); S.D. Code §57-0903 (1939).
125. A good example is §2214.2, Mont. Rev. Code (1935): "Any tax deed heretofore
issued in this state shall not be held invalid by reason of any defect in the form, substance,
or amounts stated to be due in the notice of application for tax deed and all tax
deeds heretofore issued are legalized and declared to be valid and legal regardless of any
error, defect, omission, irregularity or failure to correctly state the amount due in the
notice of application for tax deed, provided that this act shall not apply to any case
where, prior to the passage and approval of said act, the owner of land or party entitled
to redeem shall pay or tender to the owner or holder of the tax deed or the county
treasurer of the county wherein the land described in said tax deed is situated, the
amount actually due for taxes, penalty and interest at the time when said money is so
tendered." As the discussion under the heading of "curative legislation" indicates, such
a statute would raise grave problems of constitutionality in North Dakota.
126. E.g. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2429 (1943), discussed in the first portion of this paper.
See 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. at 247 et seq.
127. N.D. Rev. Code §57-2429 (1943).
128. N.D. Laws 1951, c. 276, §2. See text to notes 41 and 42, supra, for a discussion
of this statute.
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a limitation period of three years, 29 and will be hereinafter referred
to as the "three year statute." Another prescribes a limitation period of
ten years, 3 ° and a third limitation period of twenty years.
13 1  It
seems unnecessary to discuss the latter statute in this paper, since
its application involves conventional principles of adverse posses-
sion applicable to any litigation concerning title to land.1 32 The
ten year statute of limitations is somewhat more closely related to
the subject of tax titles, and some treatment of it is appropriate.
However, it has been the subject of an excellent discussion by Mr.
H. G. Ruemmele in a prior volume of this Review, and there ap-
pears to be no reason the points made in that article should be the
subject of repetition here.' 3
In any event, it is the three-year statute of limitations which
possesses the most distinctive history The earliest case in which it
was involved was Hegar v. DeGroat,'14 decided in 1893. The
action was one of ejectment to recover possession of land which
the defendant held under a tax deed. It was conceded the deed
was void on its face, for reasons left unspecified in the opinion,
but the statute of limitations was relied on as a defense. In dis-
posing of the case the court set a pattern which has been followed
ever since in cases involving similar circumstances. It argued
129. "Any person having or claiming title to or a lien or encumbrance upon any land,
whether in his possess:on or the possession of another, or vacant and anoccupied, :nay
commence and maintain an acton against any person, county or state claiming any title
to or interest in such lands, or a lien upon the same, adversely to him by or through any
tax sale, tax certificate, or tax deed, tO test the validity of the tax sale, tax certificate,
or tax deed, or to quiet the title to said land as against the claims of such adverse
claimant, or to remove the cloud fromn the title arising from such tax sale, tax certificate
or tax deed. No action nor defense based upon the invalidity of any such tax sale, tax
certificate or tax deed shall be commenced or interposed after three years from the
issuance of a tax deed unless such tax sale, tax ce ificate or tax deed is void by reason
of jurisdictional defects. The purchaser at any tax sale or the holder of any tax certificate
or tax deed may maintain an action to test the validity thereof or to quiet title to said
lands, and if he is the holder of a tax deed he may demand the possession of such lands.'"
N.D. Rev. Code §57-4511 (1943). The italics are supplied, and indicate the basic
weakness of the statute.
130. N.D. Rev. Code §47-0603 (1943), as amended by N.D. Laws 1951, c. 276:
"A title to real property, vested in any person or those under whom he claims, who shall
have been in the actual, open, adverse and undisputed possesesion of the land under
such title for a period of ten years and who shall have paid all taxes and assessments
legally levied theron, shall be valid in law. A contract for deed shall constitute color of
title within the meaning of this section from and after the execution of such contract."
131. "No action for the recovery of real property or for the possession thereof shall
shall be maintained, unless the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor, was seized
or possessed of the premises in question within twenty years before the commencement
of such action." N.D. Rev. Code §28-0104 (1943).
132. It may be pointed out that a fourth period of limitation is potentially applicable
'to tax deed controversies. The so-called Marketable Record Title Act, N.D. Laws 1951,
c. 280, §3, has been characterized as, "in effect, a statute of limitation to run against
old claims to real estate." Leahy, The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act, 29
N.Dak.L.Rev. 265 (1953).
133. See Ruemmele, North Dakota's Ten Year Statute of Limitations, 28 N.Dak.L.Rev
159, 298 (1952).
134. 3 N.D. 354, 56 N.W 150 (1893).
A COMMENTARY ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES
that by the terms of the statute as it was then worded, there was
presupposed a valid sale and conveyance of the land, 1 35 and that
the statute did not apply where there was a jurisdictionally de-
fective proceeding. The court put the matter this way:
"We are clear that the statute cannot be invoked as a bar to an
action to recover possession in a case where the defendant's
only claim of title is a tax deed void on its face. The deed
being void on its face, there was nothing for the statute to oper-
ate upon-nothing to set it in motion. '1e
Six years later, in Roberts v. First National Bank of Fargo,'
3
7
the court amplified the rule of Hegar v. DeGroat, holding that no
tax deed subject to a jurisdictional defect was sufficient to start
the statute running. Such jurisdictional defects were listed as in-
cluding the "non-taxability of the property, the absence of any as-
sessment, the absence of any levy, the fact of payment, the absence
of any tax sale, and the fact of lawful redemption,"" as well as
cases where the tax deed is void on its face.1"
Most of the cases dealing with the statute since these early de-
cisions have turned upon the question of whether jurisdictional
defects were present in the proceedings leading up to the tax sale,
e.g., in the assessment of the land,'4 0 or thereafter, such as the
135. The statute, as written at the time, provided that "No action shall be commenced
by the former owner or owners of land, or by any person claiming under him or them to
recover possesesion of land which has been sold and conveyed by deed for nonpayment
of taxes, or to avoid such deed, unless such action shall be commenced within three
years after the recording of such deed." N.D. Comp. Laws §1640 (1887).
136. 3 N.D. at 364, 56 N.W. at 154.
137. 8 N.D. 504, 79 N.W. 1049 (1899).
138. Id. at 512, 79 N.W. at 1051.
139. Any deviation from the form prescribed by statute for a tax deed renders the
deed itself void on its face. "It is well-settled law that where the statute prescribes the
form of a tax deed, even though' it requires only a substantial conformity thereto, a
deed which omits to show any one or more of the facts which the statutory form should
disclose, is void. This is so because the statute by prescribing the form has thereby made
every fact recited in the form a matter of substance." Beggs v. Paine, 15 N.D. 136,
439, 109 N.W. 322, 323 (1906). Accord, Beck v. State Finance Co., 192 Fed. 25 (8th
Cir. 1911). But this does not mean that the tax sale, as distinguished from the tax deed,
is thereby invalidated. In point of fact, Beggs v. Paine indicates that when the right of
redemption is once cut off, title passes at once to the tax sale purchaser without the
issuance of a deed in proper form. Beggs v. Paine, supra, syll. 3. This construction is
reinforced by the provisions of §57-2701, N.D. Rev. Code (1943): "Any owner of a
tax sale certificate, original or subsequent, shall be entitled, if there is no redemption, to
the possession, rents and profits of the land involved, at the expiration of the period
of redemption, and if on demand of such owner the party in possession refuses or neglects
to surrender possession, he may be proceeded against as one holding over after the
determination of his estate, by an action in forcible detainer .... " And N.D. Rev. Code
§57-2808 (1943), provides that the "failure of the owner or any mortgagee, or other
lienholder, to redeem. : . . before the period of redemption expires, shall operate . . . to
pass all of the right, title, and interest of the owner, mortgagee, or lienholder in and to
said premises, to the county by operation of law .. " Both of the foregoing statutes
obviously were drafted on the theory that the termination of the right of redemption ended
the owner's former estate, and automatically transferred it to the tax sale certificate holder.
Thus a failure to obtain a tax deed in proper form is not so serious as it might appear.
140. See "Lack of Assessment," Part 1 of this discussion, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. at 252 et seq.
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termination of the right of redemption,"' accepting without ques-
tion the rule that a defect which is jurisdictional in character does
not set the three year statute in operation. 142 This is a common
construction in other states,' and the present North Dakota code
provision amends the original form of the statute to incorporate
the rule directly into the statute itself.'
The three year statute of limitations may accordingly be dismissed
as being of little practical importance in all save the most excep-
tional cases,141 since a tax title proceeding must be carried out with
virtual perfection to set the statute in operation, and if the proceed-
ing is perfect there is no need for the statute. In short, under the
present ruling, the statute only lends protection in those cases
where it is not needed. An attempt to strengthen the statute was
made during the last session of the legislature, but failed of pas-
sage.
146
In contrast to the construction given the three year statute of
limitations is the treatment which has been accorded the so-called
"ten-year statute." 14 7 It is clear that the decisions of the court have
proceeded upon the unspoken premise that in many cases a three-
year period of limitation is too short to be fair to landowners but
that a ten year period is sufficient to give them adequate protection.
Accordingly decisions construing the ten year statute have given the
holders of tax titles a very considerable degree of favorable treat-
ment.
Three basic requirements were laid down in the statute for the
141. It was suggested in Munroe v. Donovan, 31 N.D. 228, 153 N.W. 461 (1915),
app. dismissed, 245 U.S. 679 (1917), that the three-year statute of limitations might not
apply to defects appearing in the notice of expiration of the period of redemption. But
it has since been settled that such defects are jurisdictional, and where the notice of
expiration of the period of redemption is prejudicially defective, the three year period of
limitations does not commence running. Knowlton v. Coye, 76 N.D. 478, 37 N.W.2d
343 (1949); Hodges v. McCutcheon, 72 N.D. 150, 5 N.W.2d 83 (1942).
142. In addition to the cases cited in the text, see Hodges v. McCutcheon, 72 N.D.
150, 5 N.W.2d 83 (1942); Brett v. St. Paul Trust Co., 49 N.D. 653, 193 N.W. 317
(1923); Munroe v. Donovan, supra note 141; Lee v.- Crawford, 10 N.D. 482, 88 N.W.
346 (1901); Eaton v. Bennett, 10 N.D. 346, 87 N.W. 188 (1901); Sweigle v. Gates,
9 N.D. 538, 84 N.W. 481 (1900).
143. Blackwell, Tax Titles §927 (2d ed. 1889).
144. See note 129, supra.
145. See note 15, supra, for an example of such a case.
146. House Bill No. 605, Thirty-Third Legislative Assembly of North Dakota. In
substance this measure provided that at the expiration of two years from the issuance or
recording of a tax deed, whichever was later, the claimant under the tax deed (or
purported tax deed, as the case might be), was entitled to file an affidavit with the
register of deeds, giving notice to holders of adverse claims that unless notice of the
adverse claim was placed on record within 120 days, the adverse claim would be cut off.
It will be noted that no other service of this notice was provided for. This makes it rather
strong medicine, but the constitutionality of such legislation was sustained against the
attack that it offended against due process of law by the Iowa Supreme Court in Swanson
v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 693, 27 N.W.2d 21 (1947).
147. N.D. Rev. Code §47-0603 (1943), as amended by N.D. Laws 1951, c. 276.
See note 130, supra.
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successful invocation of the ten year period of limitation. In
order to be protected, a claimant of land must show: (1) that he
is vested with color of title-i.e., that he possesses an instrument in
writing, "having a grantor and grantee, and containing a descrip-
tion of the lands intended to be conveyed, and apt words for their
conveyance . . ."141 (2) that he has been in adverse possession of
the land for ten years;1 49 and (3) that he has paid taxes on the
land for that period. Since a tax deed which is void on its face
nevertheless confers color of title upon its possessor, it is clear that
title to land may be acquired under the ten year statute even though
the deed involved would be insufficient to set the three-year statute
in operation. 150
The close connection between the ten year statute of limitations
and the law of tax sales is made clear by one significant feature of
the statute. Ordinarily a statute of limitations makes certain ex-
ceptions in its coverage. The twenty year statute of limitations,
for example, does not operate against minors, insane persons, or
prisoners.' 5' But it is interesting to note that the ten year statute
of limitations operates whether the persons affeced by its working
are under a disability or not.5 2
Does this mean that if a minor child inherits property upon
which he is unable to pay taxes, he must necessarily lose his prop-
erty at a tax sale? The answer is that it does not. For although
the ten year statute of limitations will automatically provide a tax
sale purchaser with a title "valid in law"15:'-no matter what de-
fects may exist in the tax sale proceedings -the code also pro-
vides that at any time within three years after attaining maturity,
148. Black, Tax Titles §287 (1888); Ruemmele, supra note 133, at 162. It is possible
that this definition is both too strict and too liberal at the same time. It may be too
liberal in not including good faith as an element of color of title, since there are
intimations in several North Dakota cases that the court looks to this element. Ruemmele,
supra note 133, at 163-64. Similarly, the definition of color of title quoted above does
not cover the case of a contract for deed, in which the words of conveyance are not
couched in the present but in the future tense. However, one of the purposes in amending
§47-0603 at the 1951 session of the legislature was to provide specifically that a contract
for deed constituted color of title; and the court had held to this effect earlier. Robertson
v. Brown, 75 N.D. 109, 25 N.W.2d 781 (1947); accord, Schauble v. Schultz, 137 Fed.
389 (8th Cir. 1905).
149. Under the 1951 amendment to the statute, tacking of adverse possession was
legalized. Previously the court had ruled that it was not permitted. Streeter Co. v.
Fredrickson, 11 N.D. 300, 91 N.W. 692 (1902).
150. Woolfolk v. Albrecht, 22 N.D. 36, 133 N.W. 310 (1911); Styles v. Granger,
17 N.D. 502, 117 N.W. 777 (1908); Power v. Kitching, 10 N.D. 254, 86 N.W.
737 (1901).
151. N.D. Rev. Code §28-0114 (1943).
152. Schauble v. Schultz, 137 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905).
153. This is the language of the statute. N.D. Rev. Code §47-0603 (1943), as
amended by N.D. Laws 1951, c. 276.
154. See cases cited note 150, supra.
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the minor may redeem from the sale.155 In short, the chapter on
tax sales contains what is in effect an exception for disability to the
operation of the ten year statute, a clear indication of the close
relationship between the two. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in one of the earliest cases dealing with the statute,
characterized it as being in the nature of a revenue measure,15
having as its primary purpose the encouragement of tax payments;
and this purpose is also the purpose underlying the law of tax sales
generally.
When this is seen, a rather fundamental question presents itself.
The statute has two aspects: it is both a limited kind of revenue
statute, aimed specifically at tax sales and designed to discourage
attacks upon them while at the same time preserving the right of
redemption in worthy cases, and it is also a rule of property, ap-
plying to interests in land of virtually every type. Viewed narrowly
as a revenue measure, a part of the law of tax titles, there seems
little doubt that the statute works with reasonable fairness to all
parties concerned, and possesses the additional merit of certainty.
But viewed as a rule of property-a general statute applicable to
all types of estates in land-what appraisal should be made of it.
An answer is difficult to make. In some respects, the statute
seems a little harsh. In Schauble v. Schultz,"7 it was held that a
group of minors, owners of land subject to a contract of sale, fell
with its purview and were not excused from the loss of their
property through adverse possession by reason of their minority.
If the case had been one involving a tax sale, the result would not
have been serious. The minors could have redeemed when they came
of age, and therefore would not have been greatly injured. But
in the case where adverse possession is set up under color of
interests other than tax deeds, it seems difficult to justify such
treatment of persons under disability except possibly on the ground
that the statute's rigidity promotes certainty of land titles. However,
the question of whether the values inherent in lenient treatment
for the unfortunate or disabled outweigh those involved in certainty
of title is one for the legislature, which has thus far voted in favor
of certainty of title.
B. CURATIVE AND RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
One who studies the literature dealing with tax titles will quickly
notice a recurring phrase in the opinions and text discussions.
155. N.D. Rev. Code 51-2604 (1943).
156. Schauble v. Schultz, 137 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905).
157. 137 Fed. 389 (8th Cir. 1905).
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The cases often speak of "curative legislation" without defining the
term at any length or attempting to be particularly precise in its
application. Some writers use the term to describe the short
statutes of limitation generally applicable to tax deeds discussed
in the preceding. section," 8 and in fact there is clearly a close
relationship between such statutes and other enactments designed
to strengthen tax titles.1 9 Similarly the term "curative legislation"
has been used to characterize statutes designed to limit the number
.of defects for which tax titles may be attacked, 6 ' or imposing pro-
cedural disabilities upon a party attacking tax sale proceedings.161
But the looseness of the term's usage should not be permitted
to disguise the fact that when properly applied, it describes a par-
ticular and very specifically delimited class of legislation. It norm-
ally describes legislation which attempts to legalize or validate
defective tax proceedings retroactively, and used in that sense the
topic of curative legislation merits treatment here.
It is true, of course, that both the Constitution of the United
States ' 2 and the State of North Dakota"" contain provisions for-
bidding ex post facto laws. But historically these have been con-
strued as relating to retroactive criminal legislation only, and have
not been generally applied to prevent states from enacting legisla-
tion designed to deal with civil problems." 4
In one sense, any retroactive legislation is unfair; it alters the
legal consequences of actions after they have been taken, sometimes
in a manner that could not have been foreseen. But as Prof. William
Crosskey has put it, the unfairness varies from case to case. "It is
non-existent in cases of the doing of heinous things in reliance on
legal technicalitites; in other cases, supervening unforeseen events
may give rise to equities that wipe any unfairness out; and the
public welfare sometimes demands that legislation be passed which,
in some measure, disregards individuals' strict antecedent rights."""
These considerations have been regarded as justifying such legis-
lation in certain cases, and because of the numerous technicalities
involved in tax sale proceedings the use of such legislation has been
158. Black, Tax Titles vi (2d ed. 1893); Blackwell, Tax Titles §948 (2d ed. 1889).
159. See the dissenting opinion in Nind v. Meyers & Beck, 15 N.D. 400, 109 N.W.
335 (1906), for a discussion of this point.
160. See Beggs v. Paine, 15 N.D. 436, 448-50, 109 N.W. 322, 327-28 (1906)
(discussing §57-2429 of the Revised Code of 1943 in those terms).
161. See N.D. Laws 1951, c. 276, §2.
162. U.S. Const., Art. I, §10.
163. N.D. Const., Art. 1, §16.
164. It has been vigorously contended that the clause was intended to prohibit all
retroactive legislation, whether civil or criminal. Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution,
chapter 11 (1953).
165. 1 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 324 (1953).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
particularly frequent in the course of legislative attempts to strength-
en the tax laws.116
The most frequently quoted statement of the legislative power
in this regard is that of Judge Cooley: "If the thing wanting or
which failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect in the
proceedings, is something the necessity for which might have been
dispensed with by prior statute, then it is not beyond the power of the
legislature to dispense with it by subsequent statute. And if the
irregularity consists in doing some act, or in the mode and manner
of doing some act, which the legislature might have made immaterial
by prior law, it is equally competent to make the same immaterial
by a subsequent law.""T
It seems probable that this statement of the scope of the power
to enact curative legislation is somewhat too far-reaching to be
accepted completely without qualification. It is obvious, for in-
stance, that the limitations inherent in the due process clauses of
both the federal and state constitutions," 8 as well as the provisions
against legislative impairment of the obligations of contract, " '
are applicable to curative legislation. Thus it is only natural to
find the courts dealing with these statutes in terms of their "inherent
justice," arguing that in certain cases it is manifestly unfair and in-
equitable that a person should have the benefit of a purely technical
rule where the "substantial equities" of the case are on the other side,
while at the same time holding in other cases that the retroactive
statute disturbs vested rights and is consequently invalid. 70  Such
treatment of the subject obviously stems from the application of the
standard of reasonableness which is at the core of the due process
clause.
One of the early cases dealing with curative legislation in this
state is Finlay v. Peterson.'7 The case involved the legality of a
mortgage foreclosure. The legislature attempted to validate a
method of service invalid under the law in existence when the fore-
closure proceedings were commenced. While the court ruled that
166. Black, Tax Titles §482 (2d ed. 1893).
167. Cooley, Constitutional limitations 775-76 (8th ed. 1924); and see also Black,
Tax Titles §484 (2d ed. 1893); Blackwell, Tax Titles §952 (2d ed. 1889); 11 Am.
Jur. 1211.
168. Acklin v. First National Bank, 64 N.D. 577, 254 N.W. 769 (1934); Beggs v.
Paine, 15 N.D. 436, 109 N.W. 322 (1906); Dever v. Cornwell, 10 N.D. 123, 86
N.W. 227 (1901); Finlay v. Peterson, 5 N.D. 587, 67 N.W. 953 (1896).
169. Blakemore v. Cooper, 15 N.D. 5, 106 N.W. 566 (1905); Fisher v. Betts &
Smith, 12 N.D. 197, 96 N.W. 132 (1903); Roberts v. First National Bank, 8 N.D. 504,
79 N.W. 1049 (1899):
170. See Gibson v. Hibbard, 13 Mich. 214 (1865); Berry v. Clary, 77 Me. 482, 1
Atl. 360 (1885); Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 777, 784 (8th ed. 1924).
171. 5 N.D. 587, 67 N.W. 953 (1896).
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the statute could not be given a retroactive application without
upsetting vested rights, it used language which indicated clearly
that it conceived the legislature to possess a broad power to legis-
late retroactively:
"We think that even when a proceeding of any kind is void,
with the exception of a judicial proceeding void for want of
jurisdiction, it is nevertheless within the power of the legislature
to validate such proceeding by retroactive legislation, if it would
be grossly unjust for the person against whom the healing law
is directed to insist upon his purely technical rights, destitute
of all equity.'
17
2
In Wells County v. McHenry,17 the court used even stronger
language. The Wells County Board of Equalization had failed
to meet in year 1889 and it was asserted nine years later that this
omission invalidated the taxes for that year. 174  However, in 1897
the legislature enacted a curative statute in connection with the
establishment of a system of tax lien foreclosure whereby judg-
ment against tax delinquent land was obtained in the district court
and the land was then sold to satisfy the judgment. 17  Since the
hearing in the district court afforded the taxpayer the opportunity
to contest the valuation of his property of which he had been de-
prived by the failure of the board of equalization to meet, the
court upheld a retroactive application of the statute. It stated:
"The validity of curative statutes in relation to tax proceedings
has been sustained by this court and that such legislation is
constitutional has become one of the elementary principles of
law .... Barring the matter of the right to a hearing, (for this
cannot be dispensed with,) the legislature may legalize any
step or declare immaterial any omission in a tax proceedings,
provided, of course, there is something which may be called
an assessment and levy."'76
But these statements, explicit as they are, do not constitute
the last word on the subject. They were statements made in early
cases, and in recent years there has become evident a clear dis-
position on the part of the court to restrict the operation of re-
troactive statutes in tax title cases as much as possible. In this
connection it may be pointed out that the identity of the person or
entity which is subject to the effect of retroactive legislation is
of great importance. It has already been indicated, for instance,
that if a tax sale is made to a private buyer it constitutes a contract
172. Id. at 592, 67 N.W. at 955.
173. 7 N.D. 246, 74 N.W. 241 (1898).
174. It normally does so. Power v. Larabee, 2 N.D. 141, 49 N.W. 724 (1891).
175. This was the so-called "Woods Law," N.D. Laws 1897, c. 67, to which frequent
reference is made in the early cases.
176. 7 N.D. at 256, 74 N.W. at 244.
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and the buyer is entitled to all the constitutional protection sur-
rounding vested contract rights.17 Conversely, if the tax sale was
made to a county in the first instance, retroactive legislation has a
much broader scope of operation since such a sale does not constitute
a contract which the state is bound to respect.178 Thus in Blakemore
v. Cooper,17 0 the court ruled that the repeal of a statute making tax
deeds prima facie evidence of the regularity of antecedent proceed-
ings did not affect the right of a holder of a tax deed to introduce
it in evidence as prima facie proof of title, because this was one of
the contract rights assured to a private purchaser on buying the.
land and such a contract right could not constitutionally be im-
paired. While a retroactive reduction in the rate of interest charge-
able against a landowner* redeeming from a tax sale was upheld in
State v. Lawler,80 the court was careful to point out that the case
involved the rights of a county rather than a private person, and
that no contract existed between the county and the state.
At present there are few retroactive statutes on the books in
this state. A few provisions of minor importance may be found
in the Sections of the code dealing with the sale of land for non-
payment of special assessments,18 and other such enactments are
possible to locate.8 ' But apparently it takes some overriding con-
sideration to induce the enactment of such legislation and its ap-
proval by the courts, such as a period of economic stress or a
suddenly-discovered technicality in the law which threatens to
overthrow an inconvenient number of tax titles. The most prom-
inent use of such legislation was during the 1930's, when the period
of redemption was extended several times by the legislature in an
attempt to ease the lot of landowners struggling to meet the exig-
encies of a depression; and the court expressed serious doubts as
to the constitutionality of these measures at the time.' 8 '
The subject is one which cannot be ignored entirely, because of
the extensive use of such legislation in the past; but it is probable
that no serious problems will arise concerning it in the future until
some condition as yet unforeseen prompts the enactment of new
measures of this type. The present attitude of the court was fore-
shadowed by Dever v. Cornwell."4 The land involved had been
177. See cases cited note 6, supra.
178. See cases cited note 6, supra.
179. 15 N.D. 5, 106 N.W. 566 (1905).
180. 53 N.D. 278, 205 N.W. 880 (1925).
181. See in particular N.D. Rev. Code §40-2508 (1943).
182. See note 125, supra, for a good example from another jurisdiction.
183. State ex rel. State Bank of Streeter v. Weiler, 67 N.D. 593, 275 N.W. 67 (1937).
184. 10 N.D. 123, 86 N.W. 227 (1901).
A COMMENTARY ON NORTH DAKOTA TAX TITLES
sold for non-payment of taxes which the county commissioners
had levied by percentages rather than specific amounts. Normally
this would have been sufficient to avoid the sale,"'- but there was
cited to the court a curative act which provided that "the levy of
taxes as made in the various counties for the year 1895 is hereby
legalized and made valid for all intents and purposes the same as
if made in conformity to the law then in force." The court held
that this act did not validate a sale of the land for these taxes, on the
ground that if it did so it would amount to a legislative taking of
property from one person to give it to another.
The latter cases have generally followed this view, and the ex-
tent to which the present court has questioned the efficacy of such
legislation is perhaps best illustrated by the language it employed
in Acklin v. First National Bank,"" in which it was said:
"It might seem at first glance that this court adheres *o a broad
doctrine of legislative power to declare valid that which is
void .... We believe that the legislature might, by curative
act, remedy a situation where an estoppel in pais or equitable
estoppel exists. The relief would perhaps not differ materially
from what a court of equity would grant under the same cir-
cumstances without a curative act; but nevertheless it may be
within the province of legislation.", 8
VII. CONCLUSION
Most of the value judgments formed during the course of pre-
paration for this discussion have already been expressed in its
pages and little remains to be said concerning them. It was pointed
out in an early section that the law of tax titles is not a unified and
cohesive body of law at all, but rather a heterogenuous collection
of statutes passed at different times and for different purposes,
many of them inconsistent. This fact makes a comprehensive treat-
ment of the subject extremely difficult, and encyclopedic treatment
has not been attempted here. The outline used simply selected those
topics which seemed of particular interest, while omitting others
which were perhaps equally important.
It would be, in all probability, worthwhile to take up such topics
as the law of champerty, which is often involved in tax deed cases,1 88
or the requirement of a deposit of delinquent taxes as a condition
185. See Part I of this paper, 29 N.Dak.L.Rev. 225, at 262-63.
186. 64 N.D. 577, 254 N.W. 769 (1934).
187. Id. at 588-89, 254 N.W. at 774.
188. See such cases as Morehouse v. Paulson, 75 N.D. 525, 28 N.,v.2d 608 (1947);
Sailer v. Mercer County, 75 N.D. 123, 26 N.W.2d 137 (1947); Robertson v. Brown, 75
N.D. 109, 25 N.W.2d 781 (1947).
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precedent to bringing an action to set aside a tax deed," 9 or even
the relationship of the statutory action to quiet title to tax deed
cases,' 90 particularly in the light of the holding in Herman Hanson
Oil Syndicate v. Benz' 5 ' that the lessee of a mineral interest may
maintain such an action.1 192  But it has been t elt that the law on
these topics might well be reserved for discussion at some later time.
At least one comment may be made in closing. It is simply that
it seems apparent that some sort of recodification of the laws deal-
ing with the sale of land for taxes might well be attempted, both for
the purpose of simplifying the law and insuring the greater certainty
of titles. There seems to be no sound reason why two separate
statutes should regulate the methods of serving the notice of
expiration of the period of redemption, or why delinquent hail taxes
should be sold separately while delinquent special assessments are
sold in a lump sum with delinquent general taxes; and there are
unquestionably many other places in the statutes where simplifica-
tion and consolidation of the laws regulating this subject would
prove feasible and also beneficial.
189. Baeverstad v. Reynolds, 73 N.D. 603, 18 N.W.2d 20 (1945), discussing N.D.
Rev. Code §57-4510 (1943).
190. See Murphy v. Missouri & Kansas Loan Co., 28 N.D. 519, 149 N.W. 957 (1914).
191. 77 N.D. 20, 40 N.W.2d 304 (1949).
192. The holding is sub silentio and not specifically mentioned in the opinion itself-a
fact which has caused some doubt on the question to persist because the true import of
the case has not been realized. I am indebted to Mr. Charles Foster of Bismarck, one
of the attorneys in the case, for bringing the point to my attention, and informing me
that the question was in fact carefully considered by the court.
